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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:18Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22949-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the principal's profits from entering the market are sufficiently large relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can impose a fine on the agent for leaving the firm, she will never prefer a non-compete agreement.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x4/2006en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelD21en
dc.subject.jelK1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfineen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen
dc.subject.keywordnon-compete agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordoption contracten
dc.titleShould You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn510390056en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:42006-

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