Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22944 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 38/2005
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a plausible boundedly rational learning process in games. In the current paper we study this Brown—von Neumann—Nash dynamics for the case of continuous strategy spaces. We show that for continuous payoff functions, the set of rest points of the dynamics coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the underlying game. We also study the asymptotic stability properties of rest points. While strict Nash equilibria may be unstable, we identify suffcient conditions for local and global asymptotic stability which use concepts developed in evolutionary game theory.
Schlagwörter: 
learning in games
evolutionary stability
BNN
JEL: 
C70
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
419.74 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.