Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22934
Authors: 
Chakrabarti, Subhadip
Gilles, Robert Paul
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2005,28
Abstract: 
A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) network. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of certain network formation processes. In particular we investigate network payoff functions that admit an exact network potential or an ordinal network potential. We relate these network potentials to exact and ordinal potentials of a non-cooperative network formation game based on consent in link formation. Our main results extend and strengthen the current insights in the literature on game theoretic approaches to social network formation.
Subjects: 
Network formation
pairwise stability
potential functions
JEL: 
C79
C72
D85
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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