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dc.contributor.authorBös, Dieteren
dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x2/2003en
dc.subject.jelD30en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAnarchyen
dc.subject.keywordContestsen
dc.subject.keywordRedistributionen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungskonflikten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAnarchieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAggressiveness and Redistribution-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374458871en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:22003-

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