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dc.contributor.authorFilipova, Liliaen
dc.contributor.authorWelzel, Peteren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cAugsburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe |x270en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinformation moral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen
dc.titleReducing Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Cars with Black Boxes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn481665668en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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