Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22029 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorStoschek, Barbaraen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:13:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:13:36Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22029-
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses a political-economy framework to analyze what consequences the exogenous introduction of a quantitative restriction on total emissions in a small open economy has on the stringency of domestic trade policy. The question is whether and to what extent the government, if it takes different lobby groups´ interests into consideration, has an incentive to compensate the polluting industry for stricter environmental regulations by granting higher protection to it. It turns out that the government will indeed tend to increase subsidization of the industry affected by environmental regulation. This compensation will even be more than complete as long as environmental interests are taken into account. Hence, contrary to what might be expected, a net benefit for the polluting sector arises from environmental restrictions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel University, Department of Economics |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Working Paper |x2007-13en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.jelQ52en
dc.subject.jelF18en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental Regulationsen
dc.subject.keywordInternational Competitivenessen
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Economyen
dc.subject.keywordTrade Policyen
dc.subject.stwUmweltauflageen
dc.subject.stwProtektionismusen
dc.subject.stwIndustriesubventionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaftspolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn534223036en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cauewp:5612en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
969.68 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.