Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21389 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 528
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper deals with the effects that intermediation has on strategic behaviour in negotiations. To this end, we use the tools of game theory to analyse how different institutional settings can provide specific strategic incentives and thereby condition the outcome of negotiations. We concentrate on some very recent contributions which have addressed gaps in this literature and stress the economic institution behind some predicted behaviours.
Subjects: 
arbitration
mediation
bargaining
JEL: 
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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