Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21303 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1527
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetric learning about agents' abilities provides the first principal with an informational advantage and has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal always strategically distorts information revelation to future principals about the ability of her agents. The second main result is that she can limit her search for optimal incentive schemes to the class of relative performance contracts that cannot be replicated by contracts based on individual performance only. This provides a new rationale for the optimality of such compensation schemes.
Schlagwörter: 
relative performance contracts
reputation
asymmetric learning
JEL: 
J33
D82
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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