Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21277 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 609
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses the welfare effects of price restrictions on private contracting in a world where agents have a limited cognitive ability. People compute the costs and benefits of entering a transaction with an error. The government knows the distribution of true costs and benefits as well as that of errors. By imposing constraints on transaction prices, the government eliminates some that are on average inefficient--because the price signals that one of the parties has typically grossly overestimated its benefit from participation. This policy may increase aggregate welfare even though some of the transactions being blocked are actually efficient. The paper also studies the extent to which the use of private consultants with sufficient intelligence by people with limited intelligence may dominate government regulation.
Schlagwörter: 
cognitive ability
minimum wages
regulation
price controls
paternalism
intelligence
JEL: 
K32
K31
J8
J42
J41
J38
I3
H21
D83
D82
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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