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Title:Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis PDF Logo
Authors:Albrecht, James
van Ours, Jan C.
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 399
Abstract:This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.
Subjects:Recruitment
signaling
JEL:I20
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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