Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21171
Authors: 
Magee, Lonnie
Veall, Michael R.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 617
Abstract: 
Suppose an agency awards a fixed number of prizes to applicants in different categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree of applicant uncertainty. The theoretical findings are related to awards data from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship competition.
Subjects: 
scholarships
fellowships
applicant behavior
selection committee behavior
JEL: 
D82
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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