Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20948 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 108
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.
Schlagwörter: 
Unemployment benefits
financial incentives
sanctions
JEL: 
J68
J65
H55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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