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dc.contributor.authorBrunello, Giorgioen
dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Claraen
dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:18:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:18:03Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20945-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the turnover of board of directors members in a sample of 72 companieslisted on the Milan Stock Exchange during the period 1988-1996. We investigate whetherboard members change more frequently when company performance is poor, as theliterature suggests, and whether and how the ownership structure of Italian companiesaffects these relationships. We find that there is a statistically significant and negativerelationship between firm performance and CEO turnover and that this relationship dependson the ownership structure of firms. Turnover is lower in family controlled firms and higher infirms that experienced a change in the controlling shareholder. The latter firms also have astronger turnover-performance relationship. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis thatchanges in control are an extreme form of turnover. We also find evidence of a monitoringrole of the second largest shareholder. Also the turnover of top executives exhibits anegative relationship with performance. Board turnover instead is unrelated to performancebut is related to the firm?s ownership structure. Overall our findings suggest that thecharacteristics of the Italian economy deeply affect the turnover of directors and haveimplications that go beyond the specific case study.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x105en
dc.subject.jelJ63en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBoard of directorsen
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial agencyen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwVorstanden
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensentwicklungen
dc.subject.stwItalienen
dc.titleOwnership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn834517353en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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