Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20792 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1493
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of China?s newly privatized large firms. In this paper, we analyze shareholders as agents that can both harm and benefit companies. We examine the ownership structure of 826 listed corporations and find that government shareholding is surprisingly large. Its effect on corporate value is found to be negative, but non-monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this corporate value begins to increase. We interpret this in terms of ownership concentration and the advantages of government partiality.
Subjects: 
government shareholding
corporate governance
China
JEL: 
G32
G34
L33
G15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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