Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20686 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1389
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents several economic models that explore the relationships between imperfect information, racial income disparities, and segregation. The use of race as a signal arises here, as in models of statistical discrimination, from imperfect information about the return to transactions with particular agents. In a search framework, signaling supports not simply a discriminatory equilibrium, but a pattern of racially segregated transactions, which in turn perpetuates the informational asymmetries. Minority groups necessarily suffer disproportionately from segregation, since the degree to which transactions opportunities are curtailed depends upon group size, as well as the informational ?distance? between racial groups. However, in some variants of the model, minority agents will self-segregate since they face an adverse selection of majority agents who are willing to trade with them. We also show that, if agents are able to learn from transactions, racial signaling can emerge with only minimal assumptions about the ex ante importance of race.
Schlagwörter: 
race
segregation
discrimination
imperfect information
search
JEL: 
J7
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
520.94 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.