Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20521
Authors: 
Lee, Jungmin
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1257
Abstract: 
The quality of subjective performance evaluation is dependent on the incentive structures faced by evaluators, in particular on how they are monitored and themselves evaluated. Figure skating competitions provide a unique opportunity to study subjective evaluation. This paper develops and tests a simple model of what I call "outlier aversion bias" in which subjective evaluators avoid submitting outlying judgments. We find significant evidence for the existence of outlier aversion. Individual judges within a game manipulate scores to achieve a targeted level of agreement with the other judges. Furthermore, a natural experiment shows that the dispersion of scores across judges depends upon the type of judge-assessment system and its implication for outlier aversion. Agreement may not be a good criterion for the validity of an evaluation system, contradicting the industrial psychology and personnel management literature.
Subjects: 
subjective performance evaluation
outlier aversion bias
JEL: 
M5
D7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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