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dc.contributor.authorFriebel, Guidoen
dc.contributor.authorGuriev, Sergeien
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:12:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:12:48Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20260-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration.Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who entertemporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are moreeasily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, whenmoving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because ofstricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks forintermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportationpolicies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We alsoshow that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. Whilestricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase ofdebt-financed migration.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1025en
dc.subject.jelN21en
dc.subject.jelJ61en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.jelO15en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordillegal migrationen
dc.subject.keywordwealth constraintsen
dc.subject.keywordindentured servitudeen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial contractingen
dc.subject.stwIllegale Einwanderungen
dc.subject.stwPrivate Verschuldungen
dc.subject.stwVerschuldungsrestriktionen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSmuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn37932931Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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