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dc.contributor.authorIchino, Andreaen
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, Gerden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:12:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:12:31Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20222-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship maynot be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending therelationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn lesson how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner thepossibility to misbehave he might be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chanceto learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x987en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelD2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordprobationen
dc.subject.keywordefforten
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHow Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn378140426en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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