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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ichino, Andrea | en |
dc.contributor.author | Muehlheusser, Gerd | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:12:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:12:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20222 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship maynot be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending therelationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn lesson how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner thepossibility to misbehave he might be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chanceto learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x987 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M5 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D8 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D2 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monitoring | en |
dc.subject.keyword | probation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | effort | en |
dc.subject.keyword | asymmetric information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungskontrolle | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsmotivation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 378140426 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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