Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20222 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 987
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner the possibility to misbehave he might be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chance to learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost.
Schlagwörter: 
monitoring
probation
effort
asymmetric information
JEL: 
M5
D8
D2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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