Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20120 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 880
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside option becomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job.
Schlagwörter: 
collective dismissal cost
political economy
JEL: 
L16
J65
J63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
911.17 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.