Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19282 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
HWWA Discussion Paper No. 310
Verlag: 
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.
Schlagwörter: 
Development cooperation
evaluation
political economy
JEL: 
D73
F35
H43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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