Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19237 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
HWWA Discussion Paper No. 265
Verlag: 
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Regardless of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the EU may decide to set itself a long-term greenhouse gas emission target and thus to continue its leadership role in international climate policy. As for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU may decide on a burden-sharing agreement as an integral part of such a long-term climate policy. Against this background I analyse three different options to distribute an overall budget of emission entitlements until 2042 among the member states of an enlarged EU. It is shown who wins and who loses with regard to compliance costs. As the member states' attitudes towards the different approaches are likely to depend on the relative attractiveness of the allocation options, a relevance threshold is introduced which may help to predict and understand the complexity of future climate negotiations in Europe.
Schlagwörter: 
accession countries
allocation of GHG emission entitlements
burden sharing
European climate policy
EU-enlargement
future commitment periods
JEL: 
Q25
Q28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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