Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964
Authors: 
Amegashie, J. Atsu
Runkel, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1500
Abstract: 
This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.
Subjects: 
all-pay auction
elimination contests
potential rival
sabotage
JEL: 
D74
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
413.63 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.