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dc.contributor.authorGottardi, Pieroen
dc.contributor.authorSerrano, Robertoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:56Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18938-
dc.description.abstractWe study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informedover common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finitenumber n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informedabout the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs inequilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 theoutcome depends both on the structure of the sellers? information and, even more importantly,on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules. When there is intensecompetition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to thebuyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, regardless of the number of informed sellers.On the other hand, for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms ofcompetition (presence of clienteles), for any n we always have equilibria where information isnever fully revealed. Moreover, in that case, when only one seller is informed, for manyparameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, even forlarge n.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1300en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordinformation revelationen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic tradingen
dc.subject.keywordoligopolistic competitionen
dc.subject.keywordclientelesen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMarket power and information revelation in dynamic trading-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856969028en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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