Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904
Authors: 
Leininger, Wolfgang
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1266
Abstract: 
The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so.
JEL: 
C79
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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