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dc.contributor.authorVogelsang, Ingoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:14Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838-
dc.description.abstractPerformance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1474en
dc.subject.jelL5en
dc.subject.jelL9en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwStromtarifen
dc.subject.stwStromnetzen
dc.subject.stwNetzzugangen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensregulierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleElectricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn488945666en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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