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dc.contributor.authorPriks, Mikaelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:10Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18828-
dc.description.abstractBeginning in the mid-seventeenth century, England changed its system of raising revenuesfrom tax farming, combined with the granting of monopolies, to direct collection within thegovernment administration. Rents were then transferred from tax farmers and monopolists tothe central government such that English public finances improved dramatically compared toboth the old system and to its major competitor, France. We offer a theory explaining thisdevelopment. In our view, a cost of tax farming is the ex-ante inefficiency due to the auctionmechanism while a cost of direct collection is the ex-post monitoring cost the governmentincurs to prevent theft. When the monitoring cost is high the government therefore allows taxfarmers to extract large rents to enhance their up-front payments. In addition, becauserevenues materialize late under direct collection, and since the government faces limitedborrowing, a high default risk makes a system of up-front collection attractive. The results ofthe model are consistent with historical facts from England and France.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1464en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelN43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwDirekte Steueren
dc.subject.stwRententheorieen
dc.subject.stwSteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerfahndungen
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwStaatsbankrotten
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwGrossbritannienen
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen
dc.titleOptimal rent extraction in pre-industrial England and France : default risk and monitoring costs-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn488921589en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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