Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18812 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1448
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.
Subjects: 
household behavior
bargaining power
local and global changes
price effects
general equilibrium
JEL: 
D70
D62
D50
D10
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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