Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804
Authors: 
Blumkin, Tomer
Sadka, Efraim
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working papers 1440
Abstract: 
We illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax.
Subjects: 
optimal taxation
re-distribution
education
inequality
JEL: 
D6
H2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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