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dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Volkeren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:59Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801-
dc.description.abstractIn an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfermechanisms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1437en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpay-as-you-goen
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.stwUmlageverfahrenen
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwGenerationenbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIntra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn485158213en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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