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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Choi, Jay Pil | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18700 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Tying arrangements recently have been a major and contentious issue in many high profileantitrust cases in the US and Europe. Examples include the Microsoft case, the Visa andMasterCard case, and the proposed GE/Honeywell merger to name a few. This paperconducts a selective review of the recent developments in the analysis of tying arrangements.It also discusses relevant antitrust cases concerned with tying arrangements in light of recenttheoretical advances in this area. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1336 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K21 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konzentrationspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Price bundling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Marktmacht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Innovationswettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Antitrust analysis of tying arrangements | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477413749 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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