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dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:07Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680-
dc.description.abstractThe present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily manybidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that thegame is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficientallocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small.In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficientallocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1315en
dc.subject.jelD45en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSimultaneous Ascending Auctionen
dc.subject.keywordweak dominanceen
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleImmediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477398634en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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