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dc.contributor.authorDröge, Susanneen
dc.contributor.authorSchröder, Philipp J. H.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18077-
dc.description.abstractEnvironmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets the green sector may be subsidised or the dirty sector be taxed. This paper shows that in a monopolistic competition setting the two policy instruments have different welfare effects. For a strong green policy (a severe reduction of the dirty sector) a tax is the dominant instrument. For moderate policy targets, a subsidy will be superior (inferior) if the initial situation features a large (small) share of dirty output. These findings have implications for policies such as the Californian Zero Emission Bill or the EU Action Plan for Renewable Energy Sources.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x341en
dc.subject.jelQ28en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental policyen
dc.subject.keywordMonopolistic competitionen
dc.subject.keywordTaxesen
dc.subject.keywordSubsidiesen
dc.subject.keywordWelfareen
dc.subject.keywordZero Emission Billen
dc.subject.stwUmweltabgabeen
dc.subject.stwUmweltschutzen
dc.subject.stwSubventionen
dc.subject.stwMehr-Sektoren-Modellen
dc.subject.stwMonopolistischer Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHow to Turn an Industry Green: Taxes versus Subsidies-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn850606268en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp341en

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