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Title:Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model PDF Logo
Authors:Borck, Rainald
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:DIW-Diskussionspapiere 335
Abstract:This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.
Subjects:tax competition
voting
JEL:D72
H77
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW
DIW-Diskussionspapiere

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