Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071
Authors: 
Borck, Rainald
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 335
Abstract: 
This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.
Subjects: 
tax competition
voting
JEL: 
D72
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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