Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129829 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2014-16
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.
Subjects: 
social norms
dictator games
JEL: 
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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