Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129823 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-01
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close to any alternative satisfying a simple linear independence condition on the players' gradients. The approach extends the construction of simple solutions from Anesi and Seidmann (2015) to the spatial setting. The implication is that constructive techniques, which involve an explicit specification of a particular equilibrium and are common in the literature, implicitly rely on a restrictive selection of equilibria.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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