Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127570 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 211
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
Competition authorities have a growing interest in assessing the effects of partial ownership arrangements. We show that the effects of such agreements on competition and welfare depend on the intensity of competition in the market and on the firms' governance structure. When assessing the effects of partial ownership, competition policy has to consider both the financial interest and level of control of the acquiring firm in the target firm.
Subjects: 
corporate control
merger
partial acquisition
JEL: 
L11
L13
L41
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-210-3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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