Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127280 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 460
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.
Schlagwörter: 
auctions
experiment
discriminatory
uniform
JEL: 
D44
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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