Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127149 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
26th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "What Next for European Telecommunications?", Madrid, Spain, 24th-27th June, 2015
Verlag: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the effects of alternative open access regimes on market performance. In particular, by means of an economic laboratory experiment we compare the market outcomes under unregulated wholesale competition, under a price-fixing rule (where firms must maintain their wholesale price for a fixed period of time), and under a margin squeeze rule (where the retail price of integrated firms must exceed their wholesale price). Our analysis suggests that wholesale and retail prices are substantially reduced by the introduction of a price-fixing rule at the upstream level compared to the unregulated scenario. In contrast, we do not find evidence that a margin squeeze regulation reduces retail market prices. In fact, while such a rule benefits the reselling firm by allowing for a viable profit margin, prices for consumers tend to be even higher than in the unregulated case.
Schlagwörter: 
Next Generation Access Networks
Access Regulation
Open Access
Upstream Competition
Experimental Economics
Margin Squeeze
JEL: 
C92
L51
L90
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
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