Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127083 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 925
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.
Schlagwörter: 
Institutional design
Award rule
Conflict of interest
Impartiality
Plurality correspondence
JEL: 
D63
D71
Sonstige Angaben: 
The 17th ISER-Moriguchi Prize (2014) Awarded Paper.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
125.22 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.