Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/126629 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 14-01
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyer's willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting, the seller cannot achieve greater payoffs than those obtained by posting a price in each period. However, price posting is not optimal if the buyer is sufficiently impatient relative to the seller. It is also proved that a mechanism à la Goethe (see Moldovanu and Tieztel 1998) is almost optimal.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
imperfect commitment
dynamics
mechanism design
non-optimality of posting prices
JEL: 
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
297.22 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.