Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/125930 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 209
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.
Subjects: 
Remedies
Divestiture
Merger Control
Signalling
JEL: 
L13
L41
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-208-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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