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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 15-123/II
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann-Maschler rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985} in this sense. From this result, not only necessary conditions on a compromise stable game are derived such that the 1-nucleolus and the nucleolus coincide, but also necessary and sufficient conditions such that the 1-nucleolus and the compromise value of exact games coincide.
Schlagwörter: 
1-nucleolus
Compromise stable games
Exact games
Aumann-Maschler rule
Nucleolus
Compromise value
JEL: 
C71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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