Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/122033 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1343
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
An organization must decide which proposals to fund. In evaluating the proposals, the organization may rely on those applying for funding to produce evidence about the merits of their own proposals. We consider the role of a capacity constraint preventing the organization from funding all projects. Agents produce more (Blackwell) informative evidence about the merits of their proposals when there are capacity constraints. In a two agent model, we fully characterize the equilibrium under unlimited and limited capacity. Unless the prior strongly favors accepting both proposals, the funding organization is better off when its capacity is limited.
Schlagwörter: 
strategic search
evidence production
persuasion
lobbying
all-pay auction
Bayesian persuasion
JEL: 
D72
D78
D83
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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