Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121363 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 524
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes delegation and joint decision making in an environment with private information and partially aligned preferences. We compare the benefits of these two decision making procedures as well as the interaction between them. We give a condition under which delegation is preferred to ex post joint decision making and we show how the interaction between delegation and ex post joint decision making always crowds out delegation. Finally, we analyze how the availability of the principal at the communication stage affects our results.
JEL: 
D23
D82
L23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
475.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.