Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119538 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 23/2014
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants.efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series.
Subjects: 
win advantage
motivation
contest
discouragement
JEL: 
D74
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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