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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2015/4
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated effects" become disturbingly more likely. It seems that antitrust neglects the fact that, for more than 50 years, economists have been doing experiments on this very question. Almost any conceivable determinant of higher or lower collusion has been tested. This paper standardises the evidence by way of a meta-study, and relates experimental findings as closely as possible to antitrust doctrine.
JEL: 
D43
K21
L13
L41
C91
D22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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