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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 485
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements existing literature by providing a detailed picture of short-run dynamics in a game of strategic experimentation where agents are located in a social network. We show that the delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures may induce players to increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence a complete network can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for links. This means that in the design of networks there exists a trade-off between the speed of learning and accuracy.
Schlagwörter: 
Strategic Experimentation
Networks
Learning
JEL: 
C73
D83
D85
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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