Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110297 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Volume:] 93 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 198-203
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise kam unerwartet - auch für Wirtschaftswissenschaftler. Außer ihrer mangelnden Prognosefähigkeit wird ihnen seither vermehrt unterstellt, die Politik interessengeleitet zu beraten. Dass dies so ist, bestreitet der Autor nicht. Er sieht allerdings auch keine Möglichkeit, Objektivität zu erzwingen. Vielmehr lassen sich Erkenntnisfortschritte seiner Auffassung nach umso eher erzielen, je offener und kontroverser ein Diskurs geführt wird.
Abstract (Translated): 
After providing some examples of contradictory economic policy advice, we characterise different conceptions of policy advice. This is possible because, in many situations, neither economic theory nor empirical analyses provide unambiguous answers to policy questions. Thus, contradictory advice by different economists is often possible without violating scientific standards. Thus, in the process of seeking policy advice, politicians and interest groups will engage scientists with similar political ideologies. In this situation, the objectivity of political advice is still possible, but only if there is an open discussion and, in the case of empirical analyses, if data are available for re-estimations.
JEL: 
H89
P16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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