Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/109031 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers No. 01-2015
Publisher: 
University of Freiburg, Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory, Freiburg i. Br.
Abstract: 
[Introduction ...] The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we argue how a counterfactual “bargaining with future individuals” situation may be realized as an experimental setup. That way, we can test the behavior of real individuals in a setting which approximates Rawls’s Original Position in which people are ignorant to which generation they will belong. Section 3 first describes related intergenerational resource sharing experiments which all focus on the descriptive level. Then, we briefly explain Frohlich/Oppenheimer’ experimental approach for deriving intragenerational distributive norms in the lab. Our intermediate conclusion is that similar “intergenerational bargaining experiment” may contribute to the derivation of intergenerational distributive norms. Section 4 describes our own experimental design and the hypotheses we test. Section 5 presents our results; section 6 concludes.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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